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ABSTRACT
Assessing the Homeland Security Advisory System

by
Ted Greenhalgh
Dr. David M. Hassenzahl, Thesis Committee Chair
Professor o f Environmental Studies
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

Since its inception, the Department o f Homeland Security (DHS) was tasked with
communicating local and national threat information. Over the last four years, DHS
improved its technical ability to communicate, but many people still question its actions.
Often it seems that regardless o f the message released by DHS, somebody will criticize
either the message content or the timing o f the press release. This begs the question o f
how effective is DHS at delivering messages and if it can be improved. Using a checklist
o f effective communication strategies, this study evaluated eighteen DHS press releases
that identified new threats. The study found that DHS struggles the same issues that
traditional mass media does when reporting new risks, as well as politicizing its own
messages. By loading terrorism messages with vague information, DHS forced the
audience to reach its own conclusions about the risks, leaving reports vulnerable to
partisan reaction.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Following the tragic events o f September 11, 2001, perceived weaknesses in the
government’s structure led to the creation o f the Department o f Homeland Security
(DHS). In its mission statement, DHS recognizes the difficulty it faces and sees its
mission as a learning process not only for the Department, but for the public as well:
“Ready.gov is a common sense framework designed to launch a process o f learning
about citizen preparedness. One o f the primary mandates o f the U.S. Department o f
Homeland Security is to educate the public, on a continuing basis, about how to be
prepared in case o f a national emergency - including a possible terrorist attack.”
(www.ready.gov, 2006)
Tasked with not only protecting the public, but also keeping it aware o f possible threats,
both natural and man-made, DHS created the Ready.gov web site (www.ready.gov, 2006)
and the Homeland Security Advisory System (www.dhs.gov, 2006).
The Ready.gov site targets individual and organization preparedness, offering visitors
detailed instructions on how to make emergency plans, prepare resources, and receive
information during times o f emergency. True to its mission statement, DHS continues to
develop and improve the Ready.gov site. In 2006 DHS overhauled their web site twice,
attempting to create a more professional and accessible resource for the public.
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Earlier incarnations of the Ready.gov invoked antiquated cold war imagery and
lacked user friendliness (www.ready.gov, 2005). Today the site matches the quality and
user friendliness o f more modem web sites, like Yahoo and Google, and even includes
sections for kids (www.yahoo.eom, 2006; www.google.com, 2006; www.ready.gov,
2007).

The same can’t be said for the Homeland Security Advisory System, which continues
to operate much as it has since its creation. Designed as the all-encompassing primary
source o f information dissemination, the DHS website states that the Advisory System
consists o f three parts. Homeland Security Threat Advisories, Homeland Security
Information Bulletins, and the Color-coded Threat Level System (www.dhs.gov, 2006).
Taken from their website, Homeland Security sets the following goals to accomplish
these three tasks:
Homeland Security Threat Advisories contain actionable information about an
incident involving, or a threat targeting, critical national networks or infrastructures or
key assets. They could, for example, relay newly developed procedures that, when
implemented, would significantly improve security or protection. They could also
suggest a change in readiness posture, protective actions, or response. This category
includes products formerly named alerts, advisories, and sector notifications. Advisories
are targeted to Federal, state, and local governments, private sector organizations, and
international partners.
Homeland Security Information Bulletins communicate information o f interest to the
nation’s critical infrastructures that do not meet the timeliness, specificity, or significance
thresholds o f warning messages. Such information may include statistical reports.
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periodic summaries, incident response or reporting guidelines, common vulnerabilities
and patches, and configuration standards or tools. It also may include preliminary
requests for information. Bulletins are targeted to Federal, state, and local governments,
private sector organizations, and international partners.
Color-coded Threat Level System is used to communicate with public safety officials
and the public at-large through a threat-based, color-coded system so that protective
measures can be implemented to reduce the likelihood or impact o f an attack. Raising the
threat condition has economic, physical, and psychological effects on the nation; so, the
Homeland Security Advisory System can place specific geographic regions or industry
sectors on a higher alert status than other regions or industries, based on specific threat
information.
While these concepts seem reasonable and practical, effectively communieating risk
events, like natural disasters and terrorist attacks, remains an elusive goal, not only for
federal agencies, but for most media outlets as well (Levy, et al. 1986; Crane, 1992;
Rogers, 1999; Roche & Muskavitch, 2003). The inherent uncertainty associated with
complex issues like risk assessment places these agencies in a difficult scenario plagued
by a milieu o f problems.
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Problems with Communicating Uncertainty - Reporting Agencies
Even with the proliferation o f reporting on the internet, people still depend on mass
media for most o f their news (Zucker, 1978; Singer & Endreny, 1993; Allan, 2002; Ten
Eyck, 2002). This position o f primacy o f information also carries a heavy burden o f
accuracy and completeness, often not met when trying to report new risks. Reporting
agencies, both governmental and mass media, distribute information using a traditional
framing o f news issues approach that can hinder audience comprehension o f complex
information (Levy, et al. 1986; Crane, 1992; Rogers, 1999). The traditional framing
approach stresses putting the most recent events first in the story and filling the rest o f the
story with whatever historical information the reporter can find quickly. Little time or
space is devoted to putting issues into proper context which leaves the audience to filter
the new information based on their own history and not necessarily that o f the story.
Since most readers lack any real understanding o f a newly reported threat beforehand,
this lack o f stated context invariably distorts the message (Rogers, 1999).
Journalists are expected to be reporting generalist with few specialists, especially
terrorism specialist, even at large news agencies (Becker et al. 2000). Lacking the
expertise to convey the uncertainty element o f the risk, journalists often over-simplify
important information (Levy, et al. 1986; Ethiel 2002). Making matters even more
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complicated, the demographics o f the potential audience for any mass media report are
highly variable, making it difficult for reporters to effectively craft stories that can target
such diverse audiences. Complex issues and technical terms not fully explained tend to
alienate less educated readers, while oversimplified explanations often omit information
the audience considers important. Reporters need to provide complete and accurate
information and not make assumptions about the audience or run the risk o f being
marginalized by their readers (McAdams & Elliott 1996). Surprisingly, less than ten
percent o f news stories provide adequate explanations o f technical terms (Long, 1995).
Lacking the background to understand these terms or an explanation in the story, readers
simply fail to process the facts they don’t understand or stop reading altogether.
Often, producers frame news stories out o f context with the body o f the report or use
visuals that don’t support the message reported (Rogers, 1999). Global warming
reporting is a classic example o f this and even today, long after scientific consensus has
been reached on the issue, most reports on the issue lead in with the phrase “controversial
scientific theory.” Add to this that production staffs rate the quality o f a newscast based
on technical issues like live shots and whether the reporters look professional instead o f
the quality o f information (Crane, 1992). Most news agencies operate under the mistaken
belief that audiences are passive sponges that soak up information, which isn’t true for
issues that raise concern among the audience (Epstein, 1995). In the past, audiences had
to rely on mass media outlets for all their information, but that’s no longer the case. With
easy access to the Internet, more information, both o f quality and some questionable, can
be found with little effort. While more in-depth online content might help reporting
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agencies fill in the gaps o f their time-limited televised coverage, internet use also allows
for the potential spread o f misinformation from less reputable online sources.
Finally, the issue o f trust between reporting agency and audience must be considered.
Research shows agency trust has a great effect on people’s perception o f reported risks
(Rayner, 1988; Trumbo & McComas, 2003). If the source o f the information lacks
public confidence the report’s value and effect will be diminished and distorted. Many
public agencies lack the properly trained staff to assist journalist in reporting risk issues,
which can lead to ineffective or inaccurate stories being reported (Gursky et al., 2003).
Reporting agencies must always strive to be as informative, accurate and as responsive as
possible to its audience to cultivate a long lasting sense o f trust.
Problems with Communieating Uncertaintv - The Audience
The audience itself also presents a number o f problems. W alter Lippmann
recognized one o f the key problems with effective communication early in the 20*’’
century. Everyone constructs new reality based on previous experience (Lippmann,
1922). As individuals encounter new events, they filter them through the “tiny pictures”
in their minds before incorporating them as new knowledge. This creates a situation
where the reporting agency not only has to address the accuracy o f the message, but how
to correctly convey the message based on the individual’s understanding o f the world.
This creates a situation where any gaps in information are subject to the widely varying
personal experiences o f the audience.
Cultural and demographic differences also create wide ranges o f trust and
understanding o f messages (Slovic, 1987; Flynn et ah, 1994; Johnson, 2002). Even the
very concept o f “risk” gets defined differently between subgroups o f the audience
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(Fischoff & Slovic, 1978; Slovic, 1999; Satterfield et al., 2004). Highly educated people
tend to understand and trust the information when learning of a new risk. M inority
groups tend to distrust government reports and misunderstand reported risks more often.
Women tend to perceive risks higher than men and almost universally everyone perceives
risks higher than they would prefer (Fischoff & Slovic, 1978).
Audience focus groups cite two main areas o f frustration in reading complex news
reports; lack o f context and lack o f technical information (Rogers, 1999). People want to
understand the world around them, but mass media often fail to deliver when it comes to
complex subjects. Even for impossible to answer questions, like the likelihood o f a
terrorist attack or natural disaster, people are ready to make estimates on their own
(Fischoff & Slovic, 1978). This creates a situation where people still rely on mass media
to get the story, but evaluate the importance o f it through interpersonal channels o f
communication and social interaction (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000).
Many personal understandings o f risk also impact risk perception. Voluntary
exposure to a risk, familiarity with the risk, equity o f exposure to the risk, a feeling o f
control about exposure, and a belief that the risk might bring other beneficial results all
lower risk perception (Starr, 1969; Slovic, 1987; Satterfield et ah, 2004). On the other
hand, the catastrophic potential o f risk, a sense o f dread, and the feeling o f hopeless all
increase risk perception. Audiences exposed to similar risk reports on a regular basis
begin to exhibit more pronounced attitude changes toward the subject over time. At
moderate levels o f exposure they begin to amplify the risk in their minds both
individually and through social interaction (Gerbner, et al. 1980; Kasperson & Slovic
1992). In some cases, people exposed to even more frequent reporting begin to
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underestimate the threat, basically becoming desensitized to any new information. Both
o f these situations can become problematic for reporters. People already sensitive to a
risk will tend to overreact to each new report while those who have become desensitized
might cynically ignore the message believing the government to just be “crying wolf.”
Problems with Communicating Uncertaintv - The Medium
The medium used to convey the message also creates unique problems. Newspaper
and Internet outlets can provide space for more in-depth explanations, while radio and
television outlets tend to create more concise reports. This creates a situation where not
only does the reporting agency need to create different releases for each type o f outlet, it
must also consider the restrictions each outlet imposes on its editors to ensure that critical
information isn’t changed or removed due to presentation restraints. The same multi-page
news release created for online or print agencies will probably be too large to telecast.
This necessitates the production o f tailored versions o f the message that can meet both
the time restrictions o f televised news and the audience’s need o f complete information.
Even the particular medium used to relay the information can make a difference. As
Marshall McLuhan famously noted, “The medium is the message” (MeLuhan, 1965).
This perceived ratio o f importance that the audience places on the medium presenting the
risk report can also distort the message, making incomplete televised reports particularly
vulnerable.
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CHAPTER 3

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Considering the formidable task that effectively communicating risk information is,
it’s understandable that the DHS regularly comes under fire tfom pundits and political
partisans. Traditional news framing leaves out details the audience wants to know,
leaving it up to them to fill in the blanks. This makes messages coming from government
agencies particularly vulnerable to perceived political bias. Even traditional news outlets
have questioned the use o f Advisory System to deflect possible criticism away from the
current executive administration. During the MSNBC news broadcast on October 6,
2005 Keith Olbermann surmised:
“Remarkably enough, Karl Rove's possible legal problems were book-ended today by
two pieces o f terror news. Before, came a presidential speech on the war on terror.
After, came a supposed terrorist threat to New York's subway system. Stop what
you're thinking. It's just an amazing coincidence. The terrorists just happened to wait
to make these threats until there's bad news about the administration that it needs to
preempt. Just a coincidence.”
While the motives involved in changes to the Homeland Security Advisory System
continue to be discussed across the political and editorial landscape, this study instead
focuses on the effectiveness o f the communication strategies being used by DHS to shape
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risk perception among the public. Arguably, research concerning how to effectively
report uncertainty messages is nascent, however researchers from a number o f fields
continue to study risk communication and we have some knowledge about uncertainty
and its effects on individual and community perception. Most research findings come
almost anecdotally and lack broad consensus between studies. Not surprisingly, most
mass media and government reporters seem unaware o f these findings and continue to
Ifame threats to society in traditional formats (Rogers, 1999). If the researchers haven’t
reached agreement on what constitutes good message framing, how could a media outlet
know which one to select?
A Framework for Communicating Uncertaintv
Research into communicating risk and uncertainty shows some convergence into a
general understanding o f what makes good reporting:
Determine the threat potential - Calculating the actual risk probability is considered
by many, perhaps falsely, to be the easiest part o f the process (Kammen & Hassenzahl,
1999). This evaluation o f the likelihood and severity o f the event involves getting the
best available information and using the best methods to calculate the risk (Fischoff,
1995). Audience members evaluate the importance o f the message based on the quality
o f the methods used to determine the threat probability (Rogers, 1999). The more precise
and detailed a method seems, the more attention the audience will give it. Placing the
probability and method into a relevant and easily understood context also plays a role in
audience understanding.
Most people lack the background or training to understand statistical probability
figures and the esoteric methods o f creating them (Golding et ah, 1992; Slovic, 2000).

10
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Research shows that comparison narratives can impact audience belief (Golding et al.,
1992). This requires the reporting agency to couch the probability in more familiar terms
which takes some finesse on the part o f the reporting agency. Telling the audiences they
have a one in a million chance o f being affected is meaningless and obtuse. This is
especially problematic for terrorist threats owing to the novelty o f such attacks and their
potential for massive loss o f life. While it might be tempting to compare every new
terrorism threat to the attacks o f 9/11 or every natural disaster to Hurricane Katrina, it’s
not quite that simple.
Care must be taken in selection o f the contextual example to ensure that the more
common threat seems a reasonable comparison for people to make (Johnson, 2005).
Uncertainty already places the audience in a demanding position and a poorly chosen
context will make a difficult situation worse. Also, different demographic groups tend to
react variably to new risks and contexts (Slovic, 1987; Flynn et al., 1994; Johnson, 2002).
In controlled experiments o f adding narrative contexts to risk issues, the effects o f the
narrative have been mixed (Slovic et ah, 1990; Johnson 2004). Finally, some researchers
feel that it might be too difficult for reporters to adequately address the uncertainty
inherent in probability, so reporters should focus on mitigation issues (Boholm, 2003).
As muddled as the research seems to be, making probability and uncertainty readily
understandable to people is something o f a grail quest for reporters, because it’s one o f
the primary concerns audiences raise in surveys (Rogers, 1999). Some headway has been
made in finding more effective contexts (Johnson, 2005). By simply asking what kinds
o f contexts make sense to test subjects, agencies can address m any o f the issues raised in
the previous paragraph. Since government and mass media organizations routinely form

11
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focus study groups to evaluate their operations, this would be an ideal time to get
feedback from audiences (Crane, 1992). While this topic still needs much research
(Slovic et ah, 1990; Johnson, 2004), by building and sharing a functional database o f
these acceptable comparisons reporting agencies could help each other communicate with
their audiences more effectively.
Report the threat - The risk should be reported using clear and unambiguous
language. Audiences want to know details o f the situation when faced with uncertainty
(Rogers, 1999). They want to know the location, time, and duration o f the event as well
as whom it will impact. Keeping the message accurate and to the point helps the
audience focus on these important facts (McAdams & Elliott, 1996). People evaluate
risks based on their understanding o f the world (Fox, 1999). Any omissions deemed
important by the audience are filtered through this worldview and a guess generated.
Special consideration to the medium and editorial requirements must be observed to
ensure important information isn’t lost through editing due to lack o f space or time.
Explain what the threat means - When people hear that their life might be in danger,
they want answers. If the reporting agency doesn’t supply these answers directly, people
will seek out other less reliable sources which can make a dire situation worse (Fischoff
& Slovic, 1978; Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999). Reports should not contain complicated
technical terms and esoteric jargon (Rogers, 1999). Anything deemed too technical for
the average person in the report should be explained in detail (McAdams & Elliot, 1996).
Likely questions a reasonable person might ask should also be addressed and care must
be taken to ensure that people understand what this threat means to them, their families
and communities.

12
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Give the new threat context - In most instances, audience should be given a frame o f
reference using another more common risk event (Rogers 1999). This requires the
reporting agency to have a working knowledge o f other types o f risks and how they relate
to the current situation. A comparison to being killed in a car crash or killed by lightning
creates a better understanding than saying killed in a lab accident. Few people have any
experience with lab accidents, but most are well aware o f the dangers o f driving and
lightning. If the risk is unavoidable, like a threat to a metropolitan mass transit system,
use comparisons to other risks that people take daily to gain some benefit (Slovic, 1987;
Satterfield et ah, 2004). Again, many o f the context issues discussed in the probability
section above must be carefully considered and m uch more research needs to be done in
this area.
Explain mitigation strategies - People want to know what they can do when faced
with adversity. They want to know what actions they can take and what actions others
are taking. The reporting agency should explain the events and indicators that precipitate
the threat followed by what actions the audience can take to lessen their exposure to a
risk or the effects once it does occur. Warning people about catastrophic life-threatening
events can increase their sense o f dread dramatically, but telling them how to cope with
the situation makes it more manageable. The research on crafting efficacious mitigation
messages for audiences hasn’t been conclusive. Some o f the research shows a correlation
between efficacy and action (Weinstein, 1983; W einstein et ah, 1990) while others found
no correlation (Svenson et al., 1985) and some found mixed results (Rimal & Real, 2003).
It’s still worthwhile to pursue because once people feel they can cope with the risk they
are more willing to accept it (Starr, 1969; Slovic, 1987; Satterfield et ah, 2004).

13
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Make sure people don’t feel isolated - Due to the nature o f mass media reporting
people often feel isolated by the report, sinee they generally get their information
individually. In the case o f a dread inducing threat, this sense o f isolation can seem
overwhelming, causing the audience to miss important information. Reports should
accentuate how the risk event affects the community and what agencies can help people
during the crisis.
Research Questions
The literature indicates that when faced with a new threat, people want information.
If they can’t get this information from official sources, they’ll seek out other sources
(Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000) or simply fill in the blanks based on their
personal experience (Lippmann; 1922; Fox, 1999). The literature also shows that normal
mass media approaches to reporting uncertainty, while timely and efficient, often lack a
context that the audience can understand which reduces efficacy (Rogers, 1999). Add to
this the difficulty o f trying to identify terrorist threats, which are highly uncertain by
nature, and it becomes obvious that traditional media methods will prove problematic for
DHS to communicate effectively and build agency trust (Raynor, 1988). If the agency
crafts its messages using traditional mass media methods, it’s likely they’ll encounter the
same types o f difficulties and limitations that continue to plague media outlets. This
raises the following questions with respect to how the Department o f Homeland Security
communicates with the public:
RQ] : Does the DHS employ the processes advocated by risk communication research
or does it rely on standard mass media structures and content in presenting its messages?

14
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RQ2: Could the limitations caused by using standard mass media framing lead to
agency mistrust by forcing the audience to fill in missing information themselves?
Using the literature as a guide o f what good risk reporting should contain, this study
examines the content o f the new threat press releases listed on the www.dhs.gov website
to determine if the department uses standard reporting practices that could lead to public's
misinterpretation o f the message. If DHS already uses better reporting practices, then the
lack o f faith some have in the agency probably comes from another source.

15
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CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY
Using the six-point framework outlined above, this study examines the contents o f
DHS threat messages and evaluates what factors might influence audience perception.
By constructing a table that compares effective strategies and actual DHS messages any
missing elements are identified. Compiling all these findings into a case study o f DHS
messages should indicate effective and ineffective strategies being used by the agency.
Armed with this new knowledge, the study suggests improvements for future agency
communications.
This project uses an explanatory case study approach due to the difficulty o f
separating the intent o f DHS messages from the text o f the messages (Yin, 1993). This
allows objectivity while the composite framework limits preconceived bias toward the
DHS. To further reduce researcher bias, each message will be evaluated separately by
three independent coders and the aggregate o f the three findings discussed.
Collection o f Data
Design
Coders use the worksheet found in Appendix A that lists the six communication
strategies in one column, the ideal message components in the second column, the actual
DHS message content in the third column, and then describe the clarity o f the message in
the fourth column, for each DHS press release. Upon completion o f the worksheets, they

16
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are collected and compared by the primary researcher create an aggregate listing o f what
the coders found in each message. Any variation between the coder’s findings is noted
for reliability analysis. Once inter-coder reliability is established and found acceptable (a
> 0.70), systemic trends in the messages are discussed and reporting issues noted.
Procedure
The coders evaluate each DHS press release or news conference transcript that raised
the color-coded National Threat Level or identified a new natural threat using the work
sheet in Table 1. For each section the coder notes the following in the appropriate boxes:
Determine the Threat Potential - DHS Message Content: Any risk probability
presented in the message and the method the agency used to arrive at that number. If the
message lacks any risk probability assessment, the coder enters “none”.
Determine the Threat Potential - Clarity: The coder rates how well they understood
the risk probability in the message as either “good” , “vague”, or “not at all” .
Report the Threat - Identify Specific Threat - DHS Message Content: The coder
enters the threat identified in the message. If the threat isn’t identified, the coder enters
“none”.
Report the Threat - Identify Specific Threat - Clarity: The coder rates how well they
understood the specific threat in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
Report the Threat - Identify Specific Location - DHS Message Content: The coder
enters the potential areas that the threat might impact listed in the message. If the
location isn’t identified, the coder enters “none” .

17
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Report the Threat - Identify Specific Location - Clarity: The coder rates how well
they understood the threatened location in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not
at all”.
Report the Threat - Expected Duration - DHS Message Content: The coder enters the
threat’s expected duration information from the message. If the duration isn’t listed, the
coder enters “none”.
Report the Threat - Expected Duration - Clarity: The coder rates how well they
understood the threat’s duration in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
Report the Threat - Population at Risk - DHS Message Content: The coder enters
what populations the message says are potentially at risk. If the message doesn’t state a
population, the coder enters “none”.
Report the Threat - Population at Risk - Clarity: The coder rates how well they
understood the what population was at risk in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or
“not at all”.
Explain What It Means - Jargon - DHS Message Content: The coder enters any
unexplained acronyms or jargon that appears in the message. If all esoteric terms were
explained or the message didn’t contain any, the coder enters “none” .
Explain W hat It Means - Jargon - Clarity: The coder rates how well they understood
the jargon used in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
Explain W hat It Means - Technical Terms - DHS Message Content: The coder lists
any unexplained technical terms contained in the message. If all technical terms were
explained or the message didn’t contain any, the coder enters “none” .
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Explain W hat It Means - Technical Terms - Clarity: The coder rates how well they
understood the technical terms used in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at
all”.
Give the Threat Context - DHS Message Content: The coder enters any common risk
use in the report to make the new threat more understandable. If a more common risk
w asn’t used in the report the eoder enters “none”.
Give the Threat Context - Clarity: The coder rates how well they understood the risk
using the more common context used in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at
all”.
Explain Mitigation Strategies - How to Minimize Exposure - DHS Message Content:
The coder lists any steps that the report says people should do to avoid or lessen the
effects o f the new threat. If the report contained no minimizing or avoidance steps the
coder enters “none”.
Explain Mitigation Strategies - How to Minimize Exposure - Clarity: The eoder rates
how well they understood the steps to minimize or avoid the risk in the message as either
“good”, “vague”, or “not at all” .
Explain Mitigation Strategies - W hat to do if Exposed - DHS Message Content: The
coder lists the steps the report says people should take if exposed to the new risk. If the
report contains no information on what to do if somebody is exposed to the risk the eoder
enters “none” .
Explain Mitigation Strategies - W hat to do if Exposed - Clarity: The eoder rates how
well they understood what they should do if exposed to the threat in the message as either
“good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
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Explain M itigation Strategies - What Others Will be Doing - DHS Message Content:
The coder lists what the report says other people and agencies are doing about the threat.
If the report didn’t list this information, the coder enters “none” .
Explain Mitigation Strategies - What Others Will be Doing - Clarity: The coder rates
how well they understood what steps other people and agencies would be doing about the
threat in the message as either “good”, “vague”, or “not at all”.
Make Sure People D on’t Feel Isolated - Community Affected - DHS Message
Content: The coder lists the community building statements contained in the message. If
the message didn’t contain any community building statements, the coder enters “none” .
Make Sure People D on’t Feel Isolated - Community Affected - Clarity: The coder
rates the effectiveness o f the message to build community ties as either “good”, “vague”,
or “not at all” .
Make Sure People D on’t Feel Isolated - Getting More Help - DHS Message Content:
The coder lists any phone numbers, contact agencies, and websites where the message
says people can find more information or seek help. If the message didn’t have any o f
these sources, the coder enters “none” .
Make Sure People D on’t Feel Isolated - Getting More Help - Clarity: The coder rates
the message’s listing o f additional help sources as “good”, “vague”, or “not at all” .
Treatment o f the Data
After the outside coders have completed the message worksheets, the primary
researcher collects and compares them to their own worksheets. Using a simple binary (0
for no match, 1 for a match) ranking system the primary researcher notes whether the
outside coder agrees with them. For each worksheet comparison the primary researcher
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generates and records a straight percentage o f coder agreement, a Pearson’s Correlation
between datasets, and a Cronbach’s alpha to determine the relationship between the coder
responses and inter-coder reliability o f the instrument (Cronbach, 1951). Once all the
worksheets have been evaluated, the primary researcher also records the average o f those
three tests for the entire case study o f messages. Pearson’s Correlation is used to measure
the tendency o f outside coder results to follow those o f the primary researcher as well as
provide data for Cronbach’s alpha. The Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal
reliability o f the instrument. It’s necessary to test the instrument and coder findings
because o f the novelty o f this approach. None o f the coders are experts in risk
communication and the instrument has never been used before.

21

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS
During the initial analysis o f the data it became apparent that it would be more
informative to separate the DHS messages into two categories, Hurricane Warnings and
Terrorism Warnings, since they follow a different content formats. Casual observation o f
the messages doesn’t identify this trend, so it’s not possible to determine if this
divergence was intentional. Regardless, the Pearson’s Correlation and Cronbach’s alpha
for the groups combined or separated were very good (0.80 - 1.0 and 0.94 - 1.0
respectively).
All o f the hurricane warnings in table 1 lacked any kind o f threat probability, which
was a curious omission, because this information was readily available on the
government’s National Hurricane Center website (www.nhc.noaa.gov, 2006). This same
website also details the methods used in determining the hurricane threat potentials,
another content element missing from all the messages. None o f the messages attempted
to generate a better understanding o f the probability with a more common threat. Not
surprisingly, by omitting all probability information in every message, the threat
probability sections all lacked clarity.
Things improved considerably when the messages reported the threat. All o f the
messages identified the hurricane threat and some even included wind speed
classification information. The location information was easy to understand, even
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considering the large areas that can be affected by a hurricane. All o f the hurricane
duration information was expressed in vague terms, like “weeks following landfall.”
Although it w asn’t specifically stated in every message what populations were at risk, it
was easy to deduce in all the messages what people were at risk. Despite the duration
vagueness, all the messages reported the threat clearly.
Most o f the hurricane warnings avoided technical jargon and on the rare occasion
when the reports used a technical term, they explained it. Combined with good reporting
content, this made the messages easy to understand. The only other context that was used
to explain the new threat was another hurricane, which didn’t make the threat context
noticeable clearer. Still, the coders all reported they could follow the hurricane messages
and understand them.
Mitigation strategies were solid for the most part. All o f the messages told people
how to minimize their risk and what government agencies would be doing during the
crisis. Almost all explained what people affected by the storm should do for assistance
and self-preservation. Community building was rarely (only 25%) attempted. Most press
releases contained useful listings to relief agencies and locations for additional
information, but a quarter o f the messages didn’t have any contact information at all.
One curious finding was the lack o f a press release warning for Hurricane Katrina on
the DHS website. There had been previous warnings for other hurricanes and warnings
for hurricanes after, but none for Katrina. In the months following the devastation caused
by the storm, DHS had dozens o f Katrina-related press releases, making the warning
omission even more notable.
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Table 1 Percentage o f Hurricane W arning Messages Containing New Framework
Content. Listed j y Evaluation Criteria (rows) and Findings (columns).
Framework
Criteria

DHS Message Content

Risk Probability
Method Used
Probability Context
Clarity
Identify Threat
Report the
threat
Identify Location
Expected Duration
Population at Risk
Clarity
Explanation of
Explain what
Terms
it means
Clarity
Common Risk
Give the
threat context Comp.
Clarity
Minimize Risk
Explain
mitigation
Actions if Affected
strategies
O ther’s Mitigations
Community Aspect
Make sure
people don’t
Help or
feel isolated
Information
8 messages: Cronbach’s a :
Determine the
threat
potential

Adequate

Vague

Missing

Coder
Agreement

0%
0%
0%
0%
100%
100%
0%
100%
100%
100%

0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
100^6
0%
0%
0%

10094
10094
10094
10094
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

10094
10094
10094
10094
10094
10094
88%
10094
10094
10094

100%
0%

0%
0%

0%
10094

10094
96%

0%
100%
63%
100%
25%
75%

0%
0%
12%
0%
0%
0%

10094
0%
25%
0%
75%
2594

96%
96%
83%
10094
88%
96%

Message Element

Agreement = 96%.

The terrorism warning messages data from table 2 shows a slightly different picture.
All o f the messages contained the ubiquitous National Threat Level o f either
Orange/High Risk o f attack or Red/Severe Risk o f attack. While the nominal approach
indicated a sense o f probability, it was still considered somewhat vague and clouded
message clarity. 75% o f the messages mentioned some o f the methods used to arrive at
the new probability o f attacks. These varied from “consensus o f national terror experts”
to “increased chatter” and in most cases didn’t make the threat potential any clearer.
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None o f the messages attempted to frame the probability in an easier to understand
context.
Unlike the hurricane warnings, the terrorism warnings lacked speeifies when
reporting the nature o f the threat. More than 50% o f the messages deseribed the threat in
vague terms sueh as “shadow warriors” or “unspecific threats.” Similarly, locations were
described in very vague terms in half the messages, sometimes limiting the location to
“anywhere in the world.” Continuing the trend, the expected durations o f the new threat
were vague, open ended, or used political time frames like “until after the elections” or
“up through the president’s inauguration.” Most messages laeked elarity with only 30%
o f the reports identifying the threat.
In explaining terrorism warnings DHS occasionally used unexplained jargon or
technical terms, like “weaponized anthrax,” but 80% o f the messages avoided the mistake.
Unfortunately, these explanations didn’t improve clarity in 70% o f the messages. Risk
comparisons were only used once and the context was questionable when the anthrax
attack was compared to the yearly flu epidemic. None o f the reports were made clearer
using comparison contexts.
Mitigation strategies were very good for most o f the messages, with 90% o f the
reports offering ways to lower risk exposure and all o f them detailing what federal and
state agencies would be doing to decrease the threat. Oddly, messages rarely (10%)
offered any suggestions on what to do if people were actually exposed to the risk. This
contrasted with the hurricane messages which provided the information in about twothirds o f the reports. In 30% o f the messages some form o f community building was
attempted and a like number o f reports offered additional sources people go use to get
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help or additional information about the threat. Again, the lack o f sources for help or
additional information in terrorism messages was significantly different than those found
in the hurricane warnings.

Table 2 Percentage o f Terrorism W arning Messages Containing New Framework
Content.
Framework
Criteria

DHS Message Content
Message Element
Adequate

Vague

Missing

Coder
Agreement

Risk Probability
0%
0%
10094
0%
75%
25%
Method Used
Probability Context
0%
0%
10094
0%
Clarity
0%
10094
Identify Threat
40%
60%
0%
Report the
Identify Location
50%
0%
threat
50%
Expected Duration
30%
40%
30%
Population at Risk
40%
0%
60%
30%
70%
0%
Clarity
Explanation of
80%
20%
0%
Explain
Terms
what it
means
30%
70%
0%
Clarity
90%
Common Risk
0%
10%
Give the
Comp.
threat
context
0%
0%
Clarity
10094
10%
Minimize Risk
90%
0%
Explain
mitigation
80%
Actions if Affected
10%
10%
strategies
0%
Other’s Mitigations
100%
0%
1
0%
Community
Aspect
3
0
%
6
0
%
Make sure
people don’t Help or
30%
0%
70%
feel isolated Information
10 messages: Cronbaeh’s a = 0.96: Average Coder Agreement = 93%.
Determine
the threat
potential
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97%
93%
10094
10094
93%
9394
80%
93%
93%
10094
10094
93%
10094
87%
90%
93%
80%
93%

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION
Overall, the hurricane warnings look mostly eomplete and comparable with standard
mass media reporting formats. It could be argued that the inclusion o f probability
information w asn’t necessary, but this just leaves the audience to create its own
impression o f the probabilities (Lippmann, 1922). Research shows that people are
perfectly willing to make a guess in the absence o f facts (Fischoff & Slovic, 1978) or
seek out information from interpersonal social sources (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999;
Beck, 2000). The National Hurricane Center website lists landfall location probabilities
and storm intensity information for every hurricane it tracks, so there’s really no reason
not to inelude the information in the press releases (www.nhc.noaa.gov, 2006). Since this
information is readily available from a number o f other government websites it makes
eorrecting this problem in the future trivial.
When reporting and explaining the threat, the messages are uniformly good, with the
exception o f duration information. Durations were given in rather vague terms and the
coders were simply confused as to what constituted actual duration information. Again,
by making this information so vague, only makes it more likely for misinterpretation. A
generalized version o f this information can be found on the DHS and other government
websites, but the government has a lot o f experience dealing with hurricanes. There’s no
reason that DHS eouldn’t tailor the expected duration o f the storm and expeeted time for
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relief to arrive after each storm based on past experiences with similar storms in similar
areas.
The lack o f more eommon risk comparisons to generate a more understandable
context doesn’t aetually weaken hurrieane warnings. Hurricanes are one o f the more
common natural threats people face, partieularly among those likely to be exposed to
sueh storms. Mitigation strategies were also uniformly good, only occasionally lacking
information on what people should do when affected by the storm. Most o f the hurricane
warnings lacked community bonding aspects, which seems out o f place considering
hurricanes impact entire regions and hundreds o f eommunities. By building a eonnection
with the community before the event, agencies can lower isolation apprehension and also
implant the idea o f working together in the storm ’s wake.
Other than the ubiquitous National Threat Level changes, the terrorism warnings
contained no other threat probability information. Taken at face value, stating there was
a “high” or “severe” risk o f a terrorist attack seems reasonable, but compared to what?
After being told 10 times that the risk o f attack was “high” or “severe” and nothing
happened, what should people make o f those terms? At the very best, these kinds o f
minimal probability can only be considered vague. Most reports carried a vague
description o f the methods used to determine the threat. It might be that divulging how
the new threat was identified would violate national security, but the ethereal nature of
explanations offered didn’t increase understanding.
Taken together these vague messages and omissions create a situation ripe for
personal interpretation (Lippmann, 1922). Again, research shows that people are willing
to make a guess in the absence o f facts (Fischoff & Slovic, 1978) or seek out information
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from interpersonal social sources (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000). This can
wildly distort the message as it’s filtered on personal and interpersonal levels without any
real grounding and was expressed when the outside coders didn’t equate color-code
changes with risk probability at all. It was meaningless to them.
Several times comments made by the DHS Secretary only added to this confusion by
generating mixed messages. In press conferences announeing that they were increasing
the National Threat Level because terrorist attacks were considered imminent, both
Secretaries then told everyone to go about their business and basically ignore the threat.
These kinds o f mixed messages come about because there’s no common context for
terrorist attacks and the Secretaries apparently lacked the understanding or finesse to
explain the nature o f low probability/high damage threats adequately. Comparing a
terrorist attack to a rare, but well understood tragedy, could generate a more appropriate
context. People would then know it could happen and be devastating, but probably not to
them. For most people, this would increase their awareness o f the threat without causing
panic behavior, which seems to be the outcome DHS wanted.
When reporting and explaining the threat, information was presented in very vague
terms more than half the time, making it difficult to understand or follow. This again
lowered inter-coder reliability as the coders struggled to identify what exactly DHS was
trying to say in the messages. Again, this could be an issue o f national security and DHS
might be parsing its words to avoid giving away too many details, but it still leaves the
audiences guessing what the message means. Comparing the terrorism messages to the
hurrieane messages, it’s pretty obvious that something has changed in how DHS covered
the factual information in the reports.
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This was a little surprising, since traditionally, reporters cover the five W ’s (who,
what, where, when, why) o f uncertainty issues fairly well (Crane, 1995). Often these
reports were so vague it seemed DHS was saying anything could happen to anyone,
anywhere, and at anytime. This omission o f normally expected information again leads
the audience to fill in the missing facts with guesswork (Fischoff & Slovic, 1978) and
rumor (Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000). It also gives the impression that
DHS is either hiding or doesn’t know the information, both o f which impact agency trust
(Rayner, 1988; Trumbo & McComas, 2003).
Presenting information framed in political terms only lends them to political
interpretation. Saying “until after the elections” can create mistrust when just saying
“until December” would have given a similar duration with a neutral connotation. While
it seems trivial, DHS shouldn’t give away credibility due to sloppy writing. In the
politically polarized environment that the agency must navigate its messages today, more
care needs to be taken to ensure people aren’t given a reason to disbelieve the message.
Only one o f the warnings was compared to a more common risk, the yearly outbreak
o f influenza, which was oddly compared to the spat o f anthrax mail incidents. The rest
were not compared to other common risks, but three made comparisons to the unique
attacks o f 9/11. During one press conference, when a reporter asked Secretary Ridge to
compare the current alert with past ones, he declined to comment. This left a number of
important issues for the audience to determine on their own (Lippmann, 1922; Fischoff &
Slovic, 1978), which can harm agency image as a reliable information source and create
mixed messages in the social sphere as each person creates their own reality o f the threat
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(Dunwoody & Neuwirth, 1999; Beck, 2000). All o f these were eurious choices, since
none o f them fit the particular context very well.
Comparing the narrowly targeted anthrax incidents to a yearly occurrence that kills
10,000 people seems uninformed, at best. While it might be tempting to use the attacks
o f 9/11 to impress the potential damage effects o f a terrorist attack, it fails to convey
probability well owing to its once in a lifetime uniqueness. Coupling the 9/11 attack’s
effects with a better understood low probability event could make an effective message,
however the agency needs to carefully conduct some research first to see if audiences will
accept the comparison first.
Mitigation strategies were generally covered well, with the exception o f what people
should do if they were affected by an attack. Most o f the information that people would
need to know in case o f an attack are already on the DHS Ready.gov website, the agency
just needs to include that information in future press releases. In all its messages, DHS
very thoroughly described what it and other agencies were doing to mitigate these new
threats, it just needs to apply that same principle to telling people what they should be
doing during the crisis.
Some o f the community remarks were effective, but others were politically loaded
bordering on propaganda. More neutral phasing can generate the wanted results without
tempting the audience to discount the message as being political. The first few terrorist
warnings all carried a listing o f places people could find more information, but the later
messages dropped this useful strategy. People need to be assured the government is
doing all it can to protect them in the crisis and that they aren’t alone. They want to
know who can help them and how they can help others. All press releases should carry
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relevant listings o f support agencies and locations o f additional information for the
audience.
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CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The study’s findings show that Department o f Homeland Seeurity uses traditional
framing approaches in constructing its messages, but also identified other content and
language issues. It seems reasonable that these omissions o f important information and
politically loaded wording contribute to agency mistrust and allow partisans to question
the motives behind issuing threat warnings. Fortunately, none o f these issues are
particularly difficult to correct and, in fact, much o f the material needed to support their
messages already exists on government websites.
DHS clearly needs to rethink how it constructs terrorist warning messages. While the
eolor-coded National Threat Level might be a valuable tool at an organizational level, it
isn’t an effective substitute for conveying risk probability to people. DHS also needs to
be more precise when identifying terrorist threats in press releases. Vague warnings
might actually cause more harm than good and the certainly have the potential to damage
agency credibility.
Also, flowing patriotic/propaganda concepts like “American spirit”, “be vigilant and
ignore rumors”, or how “resolute and indivisible” we are as a nation are better left for
political speeches and not press releases warning o f possible terrorist attacks. Emotional
appeals, like patriotic messages, can distract attention away from important details
contained in the message. The cosmopolitan nature o f the audience must always be
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considered when drafting a new message. Anything that can be construed negatively by
political opponents should be avoided or the agency risks alienating them from the
warning.
The findings also justify the development o f a method to construct and evaluate
messages that deal with uncertainty. By having an instrument to gauge the m essage’s
content, the study not only found the expected issues, but also illuminated other problems.
Although the method used here proved useful, it’s still a crude beginning, and the author
encourages recommendations for refinement.
Future efforts should focus on improving and testing the instrument. Using a
quantitative measurement, like a five or seven point Likert scale, in gauging message
clarity might be a more rigorous test for the instrument. Messages should be created
using the worksheet guidelines and compared to traditional risk messages through focus
groups. Also, the applicability o f the instrument to other case studies o f should be
considered. Perhaps the method could be used to create messages designed to increase
stakeholder understanding o f scientific reports or improving the general population’s
understanding o f controversial issues. Semi-technical periodicals like “Popular Science”
and “Popular Mechanics” seem more capable o f reporting uncertainty and evaluating
their content might provide useful research.
The discussion about communicating uncertainty has been going on for years, but
reporters still have difficulty effectively addressing it. While a number o f organizational
and editorial obstacles will likely remain, giving journalist an effective framework to
convey a better understanding o f uncertainty is a start. Most o f the weaknesses identified
in the DHS messages could be corrected with better word choices and by including some
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additional information they had readily available. This seems to indicate merely a lack o f
understanding on their part, and is something current research can improve. By defining
what the framework o f uncertainty reporting should look like, researchers can give
journalists the tool they need to inform the public. Now, researchers just need to find
something they can agree will work.

35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX A
Framework
Criteria
Determine the
threat potential
Report the threat

Explain what it
means

Give the threat
context
Explain
mitigation
strategies

Make sure
people don’t feel
isolated

Ideal Content

DHS Message
Content

Clarity

Risk probability
and method used
to generate it
Identify specific
threat
Identify specific
location
Expected duration,
from when to
when
What specific
populations are at
risk
No esoteric DHS
or police jargon
Technical terms
explained
Comparisons to
more common
risks
How to minimize
exposure to the
risk
W hat to do if
you’re exposed to
the risk
Mitigation other
people, police etc,
will be doing
Explain how the
event affects the
entire community
Lists o f additional
help or
information?
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APPENDIX B
New Threat: Public address to reporters about anthrax cases, October 22, 2001.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: None
Context: None
Clarity: None
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Anthrax in the mail
Identify Location: Brentwood Post Office, Washington D C.
Identify Duration: Ongoing
Identify Population Threatened: Postal workers, medical personel
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: No, “weaponized anthrax”
Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: Yearly flu outbreak, 9/11 attacks
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
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Minimize Exposure: Wear protective clothing
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Screening/sanitizing mail
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: USPS.gov, CDC.gov
Intercoder Reliability: a= 0.98
Discussion: Comparison to yearly flu outbreak and its 10,000 deaths was confusing.
Comparison to 9/11 attacks seemed out o f place.

New Threat: Public address to reporters about a general terrorist threat, December 3,
2001.

Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Intel Reports
Context: None
Clarity: None
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: “Shadow soldiers” attacking Americans
Identify Location: US and abroad
Identify Duration: Through the holidays
Identify Population Threatened: Americans
Clarity: Vague
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Explain what the threat means;
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: 9/11 attacks
Clarity: Good
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be aware and mindful o f suspicious activity
When Exposed: Contact authorities
Other’s Actions: Increased security by officials
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: Nation is at war
Get More Info: None
Clarity: None
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion: Very vague specifics with a lot o f political rhetoric.

New Threat: Press release for a general terrorist threat, February 7, 2003.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Top intelligence advisors
Context: None
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Clarity; None
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorists attacks on Americans
Identify Location: US and abroad
Identify Duration: None
Identify Population Threatened: Americans
Clarity: Vague
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: None
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Federal and state officials increasing security
Clarity: None
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: None
Clarity: None
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.98
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Discussion: Very vague on specifics.

New Threat: Press release about Operation Liberty Shield, March 17, 2003.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Lead up to invasion o f Iraq
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: WMD attacks by terrorists
Identify Location: M ilitary bases, transportation, infrastructure, symbols o f US
Identify Duration: None
Identify Population Threatened: Americans
Clarity: Vague
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be aware and prepared
When Exposed: None
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o th e r’s Actions: Increased security, public health sector on alert
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: All state governors assisting DHS
Get More Info: Yes
Clarity: Good
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion: The WMD aspects mimicked pre-war intelligence posturing.

New Threat: Public address to reporters about Operation Liberty Shield, March 18, 2003.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Lead up to invasion o f Iraq
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorist trying to harm Americans
Identify Location: Chemical/food plants, borders, everywhere
Identify Duration: From now until DHS changes it
Identify Population Threatened: Americans
Clarity: Vague
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
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Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be informed, report suspicious activity, ignore rumors
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: More security by federal and state govt.
Clarity: Vague
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: All travelers can expect delays
Get More Info: Yes
Clarity: Good
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.95
Discussion: Very vague message. Mitigation efforts suffered from “ignore rumors”
political statement.

New Threat: Press release in the wake o f terrorist bombings. May 20, 2003.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Reaction to foreign terrorist attacks
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
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Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorists either armed, using car bombs, or WMDs.
Identify Loeation: Large public gatherings
Identify Duration: None
Identify Population Threatened: Large crowds o f people
Clarity: Vague
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Vigilance, report suspicious activity
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies increasing security
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: All o f us working together can make a differenee
Get More Info: None
Clarity: Vague
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.96
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Discussion: Very mixed messages to warn people about an imminent attack and then tell
them to go about their normal messages.

New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Isabel, September 15, 2003.
Determine the threat potential :
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Storm watch
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane
Identify Location: Mid-Atlantic east coast
Identify Duration: Landfall Thursday
Identify Population Threatened: People at location and inland
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Good
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: M onitor TV/radio for info, prepare supplies for 3 days
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When Exposed: Listen to official announcements
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies will be on hand to help
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: None
Clarity: None
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.95
Discussion: A hurricane probably is the most common threat they have experienced.

New Threat: Public address to reporters about holiday attack, December 21, 2003.
Determine the threat potential :
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Increased terrorist chatter
Context: Rival or exceed 9/11
Clarity: Good
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorist using aircraft as weapons
Identify Location: Urban areas
Identify Duration: Holiday season and beyond
Identify Population Threatened: Everyone
Clarity: Vague
Explain what the threat means:
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Terms Explained; No
Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: 9/11 attacks
Clarity: Good
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Vigilance and emergency plans, report suspicious activity
When Exposed: None
O ther’s Actions: Federal and state agencies increasing security
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: Thanks for putting up with travel delays
Get More Info: No
Clarity: Vague
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.95
Discussion: Mixed messages again, warning o f airplane attacks on urban areas and
telling people to go ahead with holiday plans.

New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Charley, August 13, 2004.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Storm tracking
Context: None
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Clarity; Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane
Identify Loeation: Florida coast
Identify Duration: Landfall soon
Identify Population Threatened: People in Florida
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Good
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Prepare supplies and listen to officials
When Exposed: Listen to officials
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies will be helping
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: Yes
Clarity: None
Intercoder Reliability: a-0.99
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Discussion;
New Threat: Public address to reporters about the threat to financial sectors, August 1,
2004.

Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: None
Context: None
Clarity: None
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorist with a ear bomb
Identify Location: IMF, Worldbank, Prudential, Citigroup and NYSE
Identify Duration: Until after the election
Identify Population Threatened: People in and around financial buildings
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: No
Clarity: Yes
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be vigilant
When Exposed: None
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Other’s Actions: Security increased at the locations
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: “American spirit” “C an’t dampen our resolve” “Indivisible”
Get More Info: None
Clarity: Vague
Intereoder Reliability: a=0.96
Discussion: Mixed messages again warning o f a car bomb attack, but telling people to
ignore the threat and go about their business. The patriotic hyperbole might be
considered propaganda by some.

New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Frances, September 3, 2004.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Storm tracking
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane
Identify Location: Florida and Georgia
Identify Duration: Landfall soon
Identify Population Threatened: People in the two states
Clarity: Good
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Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Good
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be prepared with supplies
When Exposed: Listen to officials
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies will all be helping
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.99
Discussion:

New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Ivan, September 16, 2004.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Storm tracking
Context: None
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Clarity; Vague
Report the threat;
Identify Threat: Hurricane
Identify Location; Georgia, Florida, Alabama
Identify Duration: Landfall soon
Identify Population Threatened: People in those states
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Good
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Head all official warnings, be prepared
When Exposed: Follow official instructions
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies will all be there to help
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.99
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Discussion:

New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Jeanne, September 24, 2004.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Storm tacking
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane
Identify Location: Florida
Identify Duration: W eekend landfall
Identify Population Threatened: People in Florida
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Good
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Follow warnings from officials, prepare for storm
When Exposed: Visit staging areas for food, water, shelter and first aid
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Other’s Actions: Thousands o f federal and state workers will be helping
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Intercoder Reliability: a=1.0
Diseussion:

New Threat: Public address to reporters after London bombings, July 7, 2005.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Response to terrorist bombings overseas
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorist attack on US mass transit systems
Identify Location: Could be anywhere
Identify Duration: Short term
Identify Population Threatened: Mass transit users
Clarity: Vague
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
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Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be aware o f surroundings when traveling
When Exposed: None
O ther’s Actions: Increased security at mass transit sites
Clarity: Vague
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: “America stands with Britain”
Get More Info: None
Clarity: Vague
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.94
Discussion: Mixed messages, again. After warning o f the potential attack. Secretary
Chertoff stressed that mass transit was safe and not to be afraid to use it.

New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Ophelia, September 14, 2005.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Storm tracking
Context: None
Clarity: Vague

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane
Identify Location: North Carolina and East Coast
Identify Duration: Landfall soon
Identify Population Threatened: People in those areas
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Good
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Obey mandatory evacuations and have 3 days o f supplies
When Exposed: Follow instructions from local authorities
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies all prepared to help
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: All o f North Carolina under “State o f Emergency”
Get More Info: Yes
Clarity: Good
Intercoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion:
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New Threat; Press release about Hurricane Rita, September 20, 2005.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Storm tracking
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane
Identify Location: Texas gulf region
Identify Duration: Landfall soon
Identify Population Threatened: People in the area
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Good
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Listen to state officials
When Exposed: Listen to state officials
Other’s Actions: Federal and state agencies ready to help
Clarity: Good
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Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: None
Clarity: None
Intereoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion: Very vague for a hurrieane warning.

New Threat: Press release about Hurricane Wilma, October 21, 2005.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Storm tracking
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Hurricane
Identify Location: Florida and G ulf Coast
Identify Duration: Going into the weekend
Identify Population Threatened: People o f the region
Clarity: Good
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Good
Give the threat context:
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Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be prepared with supplies and evacuation plan
When Exposed: Follow official instructions
Other’s Actions: Huge listing o f agencies and where to get help
Clarity: Good
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: None
Get More Info: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Intereoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion: Best press release o f the bunch.

New Threat: Press release changing aviation threat level, August 10, 2006.
Determine the threat potential:
Risk Probability: None
Method Used: Aftermath o f British anti-terror success
Context: None
Clarity: Vague
Report the threat:
Identify Threat: Terrorist attacks on flights from UK to US and all US flights
Identify Location: Those flights
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Identify Duration; 4am until they change it (this threat alert still in effect)
Identify Population Threatened: Passengers on the flights
Clarity: Vague
Explain what the threat means:
Terms Explained: Yes
Clarity: Vague
Give the threat context:
Comparison Given: None
Clarity: None
Mitigation Measures:
Minimize Exposure: Be vigilant when flying
When Exposed: None
Other’s Actions: Raised security at airports and banned gels
Clarity: Vague
Audience Isolation:
Affects Community: US and UK resolute
Get More Info: None
Clarity: Vague
Intereoder Reliability: a=0.98
Discussion: Mixed messages, again. Raised the threat level to red, but then stated there
was no clear threat and to continue flying.
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